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Abstract
In this paper, we study how the presence of non-exclusive contracts limits the amount
of insurance provided in a decentralized economy. We consider a dynamic Mirrleesian
economy in which agents are privately informed about idiosyncratic labor productiv-
ity shocks. Agents sign privately observable insurance contracts with multiple ﬁrms
(i.e., they are non-exclusive). Contracts include both labor supply and savings aspects.
Firms have no restriction on the contracts they can oﬀer and interact strategically. In
equilibrium, contrary to the case with exclusive contracts, a standard Euler equation
holds and the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is equated
to the worker’s marginal productivity. Also, each agent receives zero net present value
of transfers. To sustain this equilibrium, more than one ﬁrm must be active and must
also oﬀer latent contracts to deter deviations to more proﬁtable contingent contracts.
In this environment, the non-observability of contracts removes the possibility of addi-
tional insurance beyond self-insurance.
∗We are grateful to Larry Jones, Patrick Kehoe, and V.V. Chari for their continuous help and support.
We thank Arpad Abraham, Mark Aguiar, Andy Atkeson, Ricardo Avelino, Kim-Sau Chung, Mike Golosov,
Roozbeh Hosseini, Narayana Kocherlakota, Ellen McGrattan, Lee Ohanian, Nicola Pavoni, Fabrizio Perri,
Chris Sleet, Aleh Tsyvinski, Gianluca Violante, Pierre Yared, and Sevin Yeltekin for comments and sugges-
tions. Remaining mistakes are ours.
†Contact Ales: ales@cmu.edu, Maziero: maziero@wharton.upenn.edu.1 Introduction
What type of contractual arrangements are available to workers in a decentralized economy
when ﬁrms compete for the provision of social insurance? In this paper, we study how, in
a decentralized economy, the presence of non-exclusive contracts endogenously limits the
contracts oﬀered and hence the amount of insurance. We ﬁnd that competition and non-
exclusivity of insurance contracts signiﬁcantly reduce the amount of insurance provided: the
equilibrium allocation in our environment is equivalent to a self-insurance economy, and only
linear contracts are oﬀered.
Multiple credit and labor relations are an important aspect of everyday life. Survey data
shows that individuals and households receive insurance against idiosyncratic risk from a
multitude of sources: publicly provided insurance (unemployment, Medicare, Medicaid, dis-
ability, food stamps, progressive income taxation), privately provided insurance (employer,
between and within family transfers),1 ﬁnancial instruments in credit markets, and hous-
ing and other large durable goods. The same consideration is true for labor relationships.
Paxson and Sicherman (1994) look at the number of concurrent labor relationships held by
survey respondents of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) between 1977 and 1990
and the Current Population Survey (CPS) of 1991. They ﬁnd that for any given year, 20%
of working males held at least a second job, and during their working life there is at least a
50% probability of holding a second job. However, monitoring all the transactions an agent
might engage in with other ﬁrms is very costly for an individual ﬁrm, especially if these
relationships include activities in the informal labor market, private savings, and the ability
to transfer leisure into consumption through either home production or shopping time (see
Aguiar and Hurst (2005)). Motivated by these considerations, the key friction addressed
in this paper is the non-exclusivity and non-observability of contractual relations. In this
paper, we characterize the optimal contract under the assumption that none of the labor
1The Panel Study of Income Dynamics reports a measure of income transfer received by households for
the years 1969 to 1985. We ﬁnd that, in a given year, 24% of the households report receiving a transfer and
67% of the households received a transfer at some stage. These transfers are signiﬁcant, averaging $1,930
(1983 dollars) and represent between 70% to 90% of total food expenditures.
2and credit relations an agent engages in can be observed by an individual ﬁrm in an economy
where the agent’s productivity is privately known by the worker.2 We interpret this friction
as reﬂecting both the costs that a ﬁrm might incur when monitoring the transactions agents
engage in and the inability of ﬁrms to oﬀer contracts contingent on the agents’ actions with
other ﬁrms in the economy.
The environment studied is a ﬁnite horizon dynamic Mirrleesian economy in which agents
are privately informed about idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks that evolve over time.
Agents wish to insure this risk by signing contracts with insurance providers (ﬁrms). Agents
are not limited to a single insurance/labor relationship and can sign contracts with multiple
ﬁrms. The contracting arrangements are private information of the contracting parties.
Given this friction, in general, the communication between agent and ﬁrms cannot be limited
to the exogenous private shock of agents as in the case of observable contracts. Firms might
also seek information about the other relations the agent has engaged in. To accommodate
for this need, we extend the results in the common agency literature (see Peters (2001),
Martimort and Stole (2002), and Epstein and Peters (1999)) to our dynamic environment
and characterize equilibrium using a menu game. In this game, each ﬁrm oﬀers collections
of payoﬀ relevant alternatives – menus – and delegates to the agent the choice within these
menus. The choice of the agent from a menu can reveal information about his type and the
other contractual arrangements in which he might be involved. We impose no restriction on
the contracts that ﬁrms can oﬀer. A ﬁrm can, for example, oﬀer a spot labor contract, a
linear inter-temporal borrowing and saving contract, a state contingent dynamic insurance
contract, and so on. Hence any contract oﬀered –either on or oﬀ-equilibrium– is determined
as a result of the strategic competition among ﬁrms. This highlights a key feature of this
environment; any side-trading opportunity agents have access to arises endogenously.
Our main result is that the non-exclusivity of contracts removes the possibility of addi-
tional insurance beyond self-insurance, with only linear contracts arising in equilibrium. We
show this result in two steps; we characterize the conditions an equilibrium must satisfy and
2The characterization under exclusive contracts is well understood. See Prescott and Townsend (1984).
3prove that an equilibrium exists.
The equilibrium allocation must satisfy three optimality conditions. First, the inter-
temporal marginal rate of substitution between consumption at time t and consumption at
t + 1 is equal to the marginal rate of transformation (a standard Euler equation holds).3
Second, the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is equated to
the marginal productivity for any time and any history.4 Third, the net present value
of the transfers received in equilibrium is equal to zero for every agent in the economy.
These optimality conditions imply that the unique equilibrium allocation is equivalent to
an economy in which agents can trade non-contingent bonds and are paid their marginal
productivity and in which there is no redistribution. The intuition for this result is the
following. In our environment the constrained eﬃcient provision of insurance is provided
both intra-temporally with wages and inter-temporally with non linear returns on savings.
The provision of insurance, due to private information on types, implies that some types
receive a wage below marginal product or a return on borrowing and saving diﬀerent than
the marginal rate of transformation. This introduces proﬁtable side trades opportunities for
either labor services or credit. We show that the availability of side trades are suﬃcient to
remove any possibility for insurance. Is worth mentioning that even for a good such as labor
that cannot be freely traded (a worker cannot work a negative amount with a given ﬁrm)
the opportunity to work on the side is suﬃcient to remove any non-linearity in wages.
Finally we show equilibrium exists. This is a key step since, as noted by Myerson (1982),
the existence of equilibria with multiple principals is not always guaranteed. We show that
to sustain the unique equilibrium allocation two ingredients are necessary. First, more than
one ﬁrm (the incumbents) must be active in equilibrium. Second, incumbent ﬁrms must
oﬀer contracts that will not be chosen in equilibrium: latent contracts. These contracts
3If contracts are exclusive, the Euler equation does not hold and agents are savings constrained (see
Rogerson (1985) and Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003)).
4This is also diﬀerent with respect to the exclusive contracting environment (see, for example, Mirrlees
(1971) and Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Werning (2006)), where this relation holds only for the highest skill type,
while all of the remaining types face a distortion on the intratemporal margin that discourages consumption
and hours provided.
4have the speciﬁc role of deterring deviations of other entrants.5 To see this, suppose the
incumbent were to oﬀer the equilibrium allocation without any additional latent contract.
Since the allocation is the most proﬁtable non-redistributive contract, any entrant must oﬀer
a contract that features some redistribution. The worker will accept the entrant’s contract.
However, if the incumbent oﬀers a latent contract that allows agent to perform a side trade,
the contingent contract oﬀered by the entrant can be made unproﬁtable.
Related Literature
The results, linking side trading and linear contracts, are reminiscent of Allen (1985),
Hammond (1987), Cole and Kocherlakota (2001).6 We contribute to this literature by ex-
plicitly modeling the non-cooperative competition between ﬁrms, determining endogenously
the market structure and showing that an equilibrium exists. Speciﬁcally, Hammond (1987)
characterizes, in a static exchange economy, the constrained eﬃcient allocation which is ro-
bust to re-trading among agents. A linear price for goods emerges in equilibrium. Some
of the diﬀerences with respect to this paper is the equilibrium concept adopted and that in
our environment some of the trades agents can make are one-sided; agents can sell leisure to
ﬁrms but cannot buy it.
This paper is related to the literature on optimal social insurance contracts and its im-
plementation through taxation, commonly referred to as new dynamic public ﬁnance.7 In
general, the environment studied in these papers assumes that insurance is provided by a
unique provider –the government– who perfectly controls both consumption and labor deci-
sion of the agents. With respect to this literature, this paper has two distinct implications.
Our main result suggests that the constrained eﬃcient allocation cannot be implemented
in decentralized environments unless every aspect of the contract is observable, thus mak-
5In our environment, restricting to direct mechanisms, while not restrictive in an environment with
exclusive contracts, results in non-existence of equilibrium.
6For linearity in the context of price discrimination, refer to Armstrong and Vickers (2010) and references
therein.
7For a review, refer to Kocherlakota (2010) and Albanesi (2008).
5ing necessary the provision of insurance via taxes or a centralized institution that makes
information public. However, our results also highlight that the presence of hidden and
self-enforcing activities (for both consumption and labor) might undo any incentives the
government provides through taxes. Related to this last point, our work is also related to
the literature on optimal contracts in the presence of hidden trades.8 In particular, Cole and
Kocherlakota (2001) show that, in a private information endowment economy, equilibrium
is equivalent to self-insurance when agents can secretly save in a storage technology. In an
environment similar to ours, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007) characterize equilibrium when
agents can engage in hidden trades of Arrow-Debreu securities. They show that a standard
Euler equation holds and that the decentralized equilibrium is not eﬃcient, since ﬁrms do
not internalize the eﬀects of the contracts oﬀered on the market rate of return. This paper
can be seen as a generalization of the previous two papers, in the sense that, in those, the
re-contracting possibilities are assumed exogenously (a market with linear prices or a storage
technology) while in this paper the re-contracting market is a result of an equilibrium game
between insurance providers.
This paper also relates to Bisin and Guaitoli (2004), who analyze a static moral hazard
environment under non-exclusive contracting. Their main result shows that latent contracts
are used to sustain the equilibrium. However, the nature of the moral hazard environment,
diﬀerently from our environment, enables latent contracts to prevent any proﬁtable entry
by additional insurance providers, thus delivering a positive proﬁt equilibrium to the in-
cumbents. Also, Ales and Maziero (2009) study a static adverse selection environment with
non-exclusive contracts.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the environment and show
that any equilibrium can be implemented by a menu game. Section 3 characterizes the
equilibrium of our benchmark environment and shows that it is equivalent to self-insurance.
In section 4 we show that an equilibrium exists and also show that latent contracts are
8For example, Cole and Kocherlakota (2001), Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007), and Abraham and Pavoni
(2005).
6necessary to implement the equilibrium allocation. Section 5 is the conclusion.
2 Environment
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of measure one of ex ante identical agents
and I ﬁrms (insurance providers), with I ≥ 2. The economy lasts for a ﬁnite number T of
periods. Agents’ period utility is deﬁned over consumption c and labor l and is given by
u(c) − v(l). Agents discount future utility at rate 0 <β<1. Assume u : R+ → R is twice
continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing and strictly concave function, limc→0 u￿(c)=∞ and
limc→∞ u￿(c) = 0; and v : R+ → R is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing and strictly
convex function, liml→0 v￿(l) = 0 and liml→∞ v￿(l)=∞. At every time t =1 ,2,...,T,e a c h
agent draws a privately observed productivity shock θt ∈ Θ, where Θ is a ﬁnite set and its
smallest element is strictly positive. We assume the law of large numbers holds. The shock
is distributed according to probability distribution π(·) and is independent and identically
distributed over time and across agents. Let θt =( θ1,...,θt) denote the history of uncertainty
of an agent up to time t. Given a sequence of consumption and labor {c,l} = {ct,l t}T
t=1, the





t−1[u(ct) − v(lt)]. (1)
For a given realization of the labor productivity shock θ, an agent providing l units of labor
to a ﬁrm can produce y units of output according to y = θl. Agents can contracts with ﬁrms
for employment and insurance against the productivity shocks.
A novel feature of our environment is that agents can sign contracts simultaneously with
more than one ﬁrm: contracts are non-exclusive. Each ﬁrm i ∈{ 1,...,I} can oﬀer a contract
that prescribes, at every time t, output requirement yi




t denotes the net transfer from the ﬁrm and can be negative. The period proﬁt of
ﬁrm i is given by the net-transfers to workers, denoted by V i(bi)=−bi. Firms can transfer
7resources over time at constant rate q.
Following the Mirrleesian tradition, we assume the productivity and labor input are
private information of the agent and each ﬁrm i observes only output produced yi
t.I n
addition, in this paper, the terms of the contract between an agent and a ﬁrm i are only
observed by the parts involved and are not observed by other ﬁrms.
We do not impose any restriction on the contracts oﬀered by each ﬁrm. For example, a
ﬁrm can oﬀer a contract for the entire time horizon t =1 ,...,T; for a particular set of dates;
only credit contracts (yt =0 , ∀t); only labor contracts, or both. We also do not impose any
speciﬁc structure on the contracts; in particular, we do not restrict to linear contracts.
At time 0, before any uncertainty is realized, agents sign a contract with each ﬁrm i.
To take into account the voluntary participation of agents, every ﬁrm is required to oﬀer at
time 0 a null contract that determines no output requirement and no consumption transfers
in every period. The contracts oﬀered by a ﬁrm at time 0 are contingent on the future
communication between that ﬁrm and the agent. We assume that contracts must be honored
and neither ﬁrms nor agents can renege on them.9
2.1 Communication and Menu Games
The presence of private information implies that communication between ﬁrms and agents
are necessary in our environment.10 If contracts are exclusive, the environment is equivalent
to a standard dynamic Mirrleesian environment as in Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski
(2003) and Albanesi and Sleet (2006). In this case the revelation principle shows that
the communication between agents and ﬁrms can without loss of generality be restricted to
agents reporting their labor productivity to ﬁrms – a direct mechanism. Under non-exclusive
9Enforcement of contracts could be explicitly introduced in the following way. Both agents and ﬁrms
have access to an enforcement mechanism (“a court”) upon the payment of a cost. If this cost is paid, the
terms of the contract between the two parties in consideration become public, and this court can enforce a
punishment to the party that reneged on the contract. If either ﬁrms or agents falsely report a breach of
the contracts, they can also be punished by court. We assume this punishment can be made large enough
so that in equilibrium neither ﬁrms nor agents will renege on the contracts signed.
10We do not allow communication between ﬁrms. We conjecture that this is not restrictive due to the one
shot and non cooperative nature of the competition between ﬁrms.
8contracts restricting the ﬁrm to communicate via a direct mechanism may not be suﬃcient to
separate agents with diﬀerent labor productivities. This is because the preference ordering of
agents over allocations is inﬂuenced not only by their exogenous productivities, but also by
the set of contracts they have access to from other ﬁrms (for example the willingness to work
an additional hour might be diﬀerent depending if an agent is already working 20 hours or
not with a separate ﬁrm). Since ﬁrms need to elicit from the agent what additional contracts
he has access to and has accepted, limiting the communication to the agents’ productivity
may not be without loss of generality.
Menu Games
Expanding the message space beyond the type space provides a signiﬁcant challenge for char-
acterization. To resolve this issue we characterize the environment deﬁning a menu game
between ﬁrms. The key idea is that any communication in the original communication mech-
anism can be replaced by ﬁrms oﬀering menus of payoﬀ-relevant alternatives and delegating
to the agents the choice within this menu.
We extend the delegation principle proved by Peters (2001) and Martimort and Stole
(2002) to our environment.11 This principle states that, without loss of generality, the
equilibrium outcomes of any communication game can be implemented as an equilibrium
of a menu game. In appendix A we formally show how to construct menus from a general
message space and prove the delegation principle for our environment. This result allows us
to focus on menu games, which we now describe.
At time 0, before any uncertainty is realized, each ﬁrm i oﬀers a collection of menus Si.12
Each agent chooses a menu Ci ∈S i from each ﬁrm i. The set Ci contains the life-time
history dependent allocation of net-tranfers and output.
Formally the timing of the game is as follows:
11Our environment diﬀers from the previous literature along two dimensions. First, the environment is
dynamic in the sense that the exogenous uncertainty is realized in every period. Second, agents choose a
communication-contingent contract from each ﬁrm i before any uncertainty is realized. This is important
since at time 0, agents are identical. Thus it might be possible to extract more information about the
contracts being oﬀered by other ﬁrms.
12We do not allow for random menus, this is not restrictive given the nature of preferences.
9• At time 0:
1. Each ﬁrm i simultaneously oﬀers menu Si;
2. For all i ∈ I, agents choose Ci ∈S i;
• At time t:
1. Agent learns his private type θt;
2. For all i ∈ I, agents choose (bi
t,yi
t) ∈ Ci
3. Payoﬀs are realized.
Let C =
￿
i Ci, S =
￿




t). Finally let bt = {b1,...,b t}.
Deﬁnition 1 (Equilibrium of Menu Games). A pure strategy equilibrium of a menu
game is a collection of menus ˆ S; agents’ choices at time zero ˆ C ∈ ˆ S; agents choices at time
t: (ˆ bt, ˆ yt), for all t ∈{ 1,...,T}, such that:











































t ≥ 0 and UT+1(·) ≡ 0.






3. Firm choices at time 0, for each i ∈ I, taking as given the choices of the other ﬁrms

















t(θt) ∈ ˆ Ci
t(ˆ bi,t−1, ˆ yi,t−1| ˆ Ci), ˆ Ci
t(ˆ bi,t−1, ˆ yi,t−1| ˆ Ci) ∈ ˆ Si
b) ˆ b
−i
t (θt) ∈ ˆ C
−i
t (ˆ b−i,t−1, ˆ y−i,t−1| ˆ C−i) and ˆ C
−i
t (ˆ b−i,t−1, ˆ y−i,t−1| ˆ C−i) ∈ ˆ S−i.
In the deﬁnition of menu games each ﬁrm i is aﬀected by the choices of other ﬁrms via
the action of the agent. This is true both at time zero and at each period t. Firms compete
playing a Nash game at time zero taking this into account.
The above deﬁnition does not impose any restriction on the size of a menu. A menu
can contain more alternatives than the cardinality of the type space, implying that in every
period some allocations are not chosen in equilibrium. Similarly, at time 0 a ﬁrm might oﬀer
more than one set of contracts, also implying that some contracts are oﬀered and not chosen
by agents in equilibrium. We denote a contract as latent if it is oﬀered in equilibrium
by a ﬁrm but is not chosen in equilibrium by any agent. In this paper we show that in
environments with competition under non-exclusivity, latent contracts have a fundamental
role in sustaining equilibrium allocations by preventing other ﬁrms from deviating to other
contracts.13







In this case, if an agent accepts the menu ˜ C
j
t at time 0, he has the option of receiving a
net transfer bj in exchange of an output requirement yj at time t. The time zero cost of
this option is zero since the agent at time t can also choose no interaction with ﬁrm j,
i.e. allocation (0,0). The menu ˜ C
j
t is reminiscent of entry strategies used in static duopoly
competition.
We denote the equilibrium allocation of a menu game by (ˆ b, ˆ y). In the next section we show
that an equilibrium exists and fully characterize the unique equilibrium allocation.
13This feature of oﬀ equilibrium contracts was ﬁrst noted by Arnott and Stiglitz (1991).
113 Equilibrium Characterization
The Delegation Principle allow us to restrict to menu games in order to characterize the
equilibrium of an arbitrary communication mechanism. In the following two sections we
show the main result of this paper: there is a unique equilibrium allocation of a menu game
and it coincides with the equilibrium of a self-insurance economy. In this section, we prove
that any equilibrium must satisfy three conditions: the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure is equal to marginal productivity for all agents, the standard Euler
equation holds, and the net-present value of the transfers received under any history of shocks
is zero. These conditions are the suﬃcient ﬁrst-order conditions of a self-insurance economy.
In section 4 we show an equilibrium exists.
3.1 Characterization under Exclusive Contracts
Before characterizing the optimality conditions in our environment, we review two robust
equilibrium conditions in an environment in which there is competition between insurance
providers and contracts are exclusive. Prescott and Townsend (1984) shows that in a general
class of private information economy, the ﬁrst welfare theorem holds. The decentralized
economy is equivalent to a planning problem that maximizes the ex ante lifetime utility of
the agents subject to feasibility and incentive compatibility constraints (in every period for
every realization, agents weakly prefer the allocation designed for them).
In an environment similar to ours, and in the presence of exclusive contracting, the
equilibrium allocation has the following features:14
1. The marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is equated to the
14For a review of the results of constrained eﬃcient allocation in dynamic Mirrleesian environments, refer
to Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Werning (2006).






















, ∀ θ ￿= ¯ θ,θ ∈ Θ, (3)
where ¯ θ ≡ maxθ∈Θ θ. The intuition for this result is the following: in order to separate
types, it is optimal to discourage less productive agents from working. This implies
that all but the most productive agents work and consume less than they would in an
competitive environment.
2. If preferences are separable in consumption and leisure, the marginal rate of substitu-
tion of consumption between any two periods diﬀers from the inter-temporal rate of















This equation, derived originally by Rogerson (1985) and generalized in Golosov,
Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003), implies that for all periods
u
￿(c(θ







This means that it is optimal to make any type of agent saving constrained in order
to encourage the truthful revelation of productivity in future periods.
3.2 Optimality Conditions under Non-exclusivity
We now derive the equilibrium conditions in the presence of non-exclusive contracting. The
ﬁrst result refers to the intra-temporal consumption and leisure choice. Under exclusivity,
the optimal contract provides incentives to more skilled workers by discouraging less skilled
agents to work (with respect to the full information allocation). The next lemma shows that
13an equation as (3) cannot hold when contracts are non-exclusive, since agents can work an
additional amount for other ﬁrms.















i bi(θt) and y(θt)=
￿
i yi(θt) and (bi(θt),yi(θt)) are the contracts chosen by
an agent with history θt from ﬁrm i at time t.













In this case, the agent would like to consume and work more than the equilibrium contract.
An entrant15 can make strictly positive proﬁts oﬀering a supplemental contract with more
consumption and output. Consider an entrant that oﬀers the null contract at time τ ￿= t and
at time t, the contract CE
t = {(−ε,δ∗(ε)),(0,0)} where δ∗ and ε are constructed as follows.

























If ε = 0, the solution for the above problem is δ∗(0|θt) > 0 given that (6) holds. From
the Theorem of the Maximum, the solution δ∗(ε) is continuous on ε. Fix ￿1 > 0 such that
|δ∗(0) − 0| >￿ 1. There exists ￿2 > 0 such that if |ε − 0| <￿ 2 then |δ∗(ε) − δ∗(0)| <￿ 1.L e t
15Throughout the paper, an incumbent refers to a ﬁrm that oﬀers a menu that contains transfers and/or
output recommendations other than the null contract, and some agent chooses some of these contracts in
equilibrium. An entrant refers to an insurance provider that, at all times, every agent chooses the null
contract from its menus. We assume the number of ﬁrms I is large enough so that an entrant always exists.
14ε be such that 0 <ε<￿ 2. This contract delivers strictly positive proﬁts, proportional to
ε, and the agent is strictly better oﬀ given that his utility is higher in some history with
positive probability. This contract is always proﬁtable for the entrant even if other types ˜ θt
accept the deviating contract. The only way to deter this deviation is to have some latent
contract that makes no agent willing to choose it. However, if such a contract existed, it
would have been chosen in the original equilibrium, contradicting the fact that it is a latent
contract.
It is worth highlighting that the result under exclusivity breaks down the moment the
agent can transform in small amounts consumption into leisure. This, from an applied
perspective, might be particularly relevant since workers have the option, for example, to
trade consumption for leisure in small amount by hiring individuals to perform non-leisure,
non-work activities.
We actually show that equation (5) holds with equality. The additional step required to
show this is proved in Proposition 1 this is due to an additional diﬃculty. Lemma 1 only
requires an additional increase in output. Ruling out the opposite inequality, thus leading to
(5) holding with equality, requires a reduction in output. Since agents cannot work negative
hours, this deviation cannot be performed by an entrant and can only be oﬀered by the
incumbent
The second result under non-exclusivity refers to the inter-temporal consumption choice.
When contracts are exclusive, the provision of incentives implies that agents are savings
constrained. The following lemma shows that this cannot happen under non-exclusivity.
















Proof. In appendix B.
15The intuition for the result is the following. If the equilibrium allocation does not satisfy
the Euler equation, an entrant ﬁrm can oﬀer a savings (borrowing) contract at time t with
an implicit interest rate lower (higher) than the marginal rate of transformation. As long as
this contract is accepted, the entrant makes strictly positive proﬁts and said contract can be
constructed in a way that provides higher utility to the agent.16
In the next proposition, we show that in equilibrium, for every history, the marginal
rate of substitution (MRS) between consumption and leisure is equated to the marginal
productivity and also that the lifetime transfer received under any history is equal to zero,
so that there is no cross-subsidization between types.
Proposition 1. In any equilibrium the following two conditions hold:

























Showing that (11) holds with equality requires two steps. For any two productivity
realizations, we ﬁrst show that the worker with higher output must receive a higher net
transfer. If not – in which case the allocation would be as described in Mirrlees (1971)–
an entrant can oﬀer an additional labor opportunity which would induce misreporting to
the incumbent. Second, we show that net transfers must be the same across the two types,
failure from doing this would constitute a form of “negative” insurance. Such a contract
would be dominated by a more proﬁtable contract at time zero. Whenever an incumbent
16The previous two results would also go through relaxing the assumption on labor productivity shocks
being independent over time. This would not be the case in proposition 1 since it also includes deviations
by the incumbent which are history dependent.
16deviates from a proposed contract the key diﬃculty is to show that no latent contract might
induce negative proﬁts.
Proof. In appendix B.
3.3 Equivalence to Self-Insurance
The previous results showed that the equilibrium allocation satisﬁes a standard Euler equa-
tion, the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is equated to
marginal productivity in every period, and the net present value of transfers received under
any history is equal to zero (there is no redistribution). These equilibrium conditions are
the same optimality conditions in a decentralized economy in which agents can borrow and
save at rate R =1 /q.
Let {c∗,y∗} = {c∗(θt),y∗(θt)}T



























R1−t =0 , ∀θ
T,
where R is taken as given.
Proposition 2. Let {ˆ b, ˆ y} = {ˆ b(θt), ˆ y(θt)}T
t=1 be the equilibrium allocation of a menu game.
Let the agents’ consumption be ˆ c(θt)=ˆ b(θt)+ˆ y(θt) for all θt and for all t.I f R =1 /q,
c∗(θt)=ˆ c(θt) and y∗(θt)=ˆ y(θt) for all θt and for all t.
























R1−t =0 , ∀θ
T. (15)
17A solution to (12) exists. Also, the maximization problem (12) has a strictly concave objec-
tive function and the constraint set is convex; hence, the ﬁrst order conditions are necessary
and suﬃcient for the optimum and the optimum is unique.
The previous proposition summarizes how non-exclusivity and non-observability of con-
tracts limit the ability to provide insurance and also limits the contracts that are oﬀered in
equilibrium. Our environment with ﬁrms interacting strategically and being allowed to oﬀer
any type of contracts is equivalent to an environment with competitive ﬁrms oﬀering linear
contracts with no redistribution.
4 Existence of Equilibrium
So far, we have characterized three necessary properties of the equilibrium allocation: (9),
(10), and (11) and have shown that there is a unique allocation that satisﬁes these conditions,
which we denote by {ˆ b, ˆ y} = {(b(θt),y(θt))T
t=1 θt ∈ Θt}. The next proposition determines
existence of equilibrium of a menu game by providing strategies of the ﬁrms (menus) that
sustain this allocation as an equilibrium.
An important message of section 2 is that direct mechanisms might not be suﬃcient
when characterizing the optimal contract. This means that ﬁrms might oﬀer latent (oﬀ-
equilibrium) contracts and these contracts play an important role in this environment, in
particular to show that an equilibrium exists. We show that equilibrium would fail to exist
if ﬁrms were restricted to oﬀering direct mechanisms. The menus we introduce to guarantee
existence are similar to the ones derived in the characterization of equilibrium to show that
any contract other than self-insurance is unproﬁtable. Although the equilibrium of a menu
game is unique in terms of allocation, there are multiple equilibrium strategies that can
sustain it.
We ﬁrst state a useful result to show existence. The lemma below illustrates a stan-
dard monotonicity result: more productive agents always produce more output than less
productive agents. This is independent of the menu oﬀered by an entrant.
18Lemma 3. For all time t and history θt−1 if θt > ˆ θt, then under any deviation, y(θt−1,θ t) >
y(θt−1, ˆ θt), where y(θt−1,θ t) is the total output chosen by agent with history θt−1,θ t.17
Proof. Follows from standard arguments.
Proposition 3. Allocation {ˆ b, ˆ y} is an equilibrium allocation of a menu game.
The proof shows that any contract oﬀered by an entrant falls into two categories. Either
it will be unproﬁtable for the ﬁrm and hence not oﬀered, or it will be welfare decreasing for
the agents and hence not accepted.
Proof. The proof consists of two main steps:
• Step 1 constructs the equilibrium menus of the incumbent ﬁrm that sustain the allo-
cation.
• Step 2 shows that no other ﬁrm (labeled entrant) can deviate and oﬀer a menu that
is at the same time proﬁtable and chosen by the agents.
Step 1
To show the allocation is an equilibrium we start by constructing strategies of the ﬁrms and
the agents that sustain allocation {ˆ b, ˆ y} as an equilibrium. Firms i ∈{ 1,2} oﬀer the menus






































17For brevity of notation, we let (b(θt−1,θ),y(θt−1,θ)) denote the total transfer and output choice of the
agent, which can be achieved by choosing allocation for a combination of contracts, including any deviation
by a potential entrant. Similarly, Ut+1(b(θt−1,θ),y(θt−1,θ)) denotes the continuation utility associated with
all the contracts the agent has chosen up to time t.












t = b(θ),y i




































For the initial period, t = 1, the menu is deﬁned as above with bi




t denotes the net withdrawals (or deposit if negative) from the “savings
account” oﬀered by ﬁrm i.
Together with the above menu, ﬁrm i ∈{ 1,2} also oﬀers two additional latent menus:























0 =0 ,x t ∈ R
￿
. (16)
The static contract for all t =1 ,...,T is given by:18
C
i,S
t = {(0,δ):δ ≥ 0}. (17)
Given these menus, the agents choose at time zero menu ˆ Ci from one of the two ﬁrms.
We derive the agents’ choices by backward induction. At time T, an agent with history
(θT−1,θ T) and past choices (˜ b(θT−1), ˜ y(θT−1)) chooses from menu Ci
T(˜ bi(θT−1), ˜ yi(θT−1)) the












. For time t ∈
{1,...,T −1}, an agent with history θt and past choices (˜ bi(θt−1), ˜ yi(θt−1)) chooses from menu
Ci



























































18Both latent contracts deliver zero proﬁts to ﬁrms.




θt qtπ(θt)˜ bi(θt)=0 .
Step 2
To complete the equilibrium proof, we show there is no deviation by entrants or incumbents
that at the same time increases agents’ utility and delivers positive proﬁts. In particular,
the latent contracts Ci,S and Ci,D are suﬃcient to deter any potential deviations. These
contracts play a key role: the dynamic contract allows agents to transfer resources over time
(at rate 1/q) while the static menu gives agents the opportunity to work additional hours at
a wage equal to their marginal productivity. Hence, these contracts signiﬁcantly limit the
deviations an entrant could oﬀer.
Consider a ﬁrm i, with i ￿=1 ,2, oﬀering a menu (call it the entrant ﬁrm). Let E equal the
amount of resources the entrant transfers in expected terms to the agent. To be proﬁtable,
the time zero value of E must be negative. We now show that the utility attained by agents
from accepting any contract oﬀered by the entrant (which could be combined with the
incumbent’s menu) is less than or equal to the utility derived from an environment in which
the agent can optimally borrow and save an amount E and choose hours freely. This implies
that the utility under any deviation cannot be higher than the utility under the candidate
equilibrium. The proof is provided for a two periods case. By backward induction, it can be
extended to any ﬁnite T periods.
Throughout this step, let ˆ x(θ)a n dˆ y(θ) denote, respectively, the transfer and the output
chosen by an agent of type θ in the incumbent’s menu, and let b(θ) and y(θ) denote, respec-
tively, the transfer and the output chosen by an agent of type θ in the entrant’s menu.19
Let W be the lifetime utility agents achieve by accepting an entrant contract, and let ˆ W
be the lifetime utility implied by the candidate equilibrium allocation. A key aspect of the
proof is to compare the utility in period two for an agent signing the entrant contract and
the utility an agent derives when he optimally choses labor. Let ˜ W be the indirect utility
attained in the second period by an agent starting that period with net resources xθ and
19In the presence of a deviation by an entrant, the agent’s choice in the incumbent’s menus may not be
the equilibrium allocation. Also in this notation, the allocations can be the result of the choices in diﬀerent
menus by entrants and/or incumbents.
21optimally choosing labor:



















Let W(ˆ x(θ),θ) be the second period utility of a type θ agent in period one derived from





























The variables deﬁned next quantify (in terms of extra resources that need to be transferred)
the diﬀerence in utility levels. For all θ deﬁne b∗
θ:
W(ˆ x(θ),θ)= ˜ W(ˆ x(θ)+b
∗
θ). (21)
From the above deﬁnition, b∗
θ ≥ 0 is the extra resources transferred to the agent to make him
indiﬀerent about accepting the entrant’s contract or optimally choosing the output produced
at time 2.















+β ˜ W(xθ), (22)









The parameter g is a “scaling ” parameter that modiﬁes the magnitude of the transfers from
the entrant. The following lemma compares the value of ˆ W and W exploiting the properties
of the function G(·).
22Lemma 4.
1. G(1) ≥ W and G(0) = ˆ W;
2. For all g>0, G￿(g) ≤ G￿(0).
3. G￿(0) < 0;
Proof. In appendix C
The previous lemma immediately implies that ˆ W ≥ W. This completes the proof since it
shows that no ﬁrm with i ￿=1 ,2 will deviate from the proposed equilibrium. Also no ﬁrm
i =1 ,2 deviates. This follows from the fact that the oﬀ-equilibrium menus Ci,D and Ci,S
are oﬀered by both ﬁrms.
Summarizing, the allocation {ˆ b, ˆ y} can be sustained in equilibrium by at least two in-
cumbents simultaneously oﬀering the menu ˆ Ci and the latent contracts Ci,S and Ci,D. This
is necessary to prevent deviations by any ﬁrm to a more proﬁtable and ex ante welfare
improving contract that features redistribution. This result highlights the importance of
allowing ﬁrms to oﬀer latent contracts. If oﬀering such contracts were not allowed, as in
direct mechanisms, equilibrium would fail to exist in this environment.
An immediate implication of the existence result and proposition 2 is that the equilibrium
is unique in terms of allocation.
Corollary 1. There is a unique equilibrium allocation of the menu game.
Although there might exist diﬀerent strategies (menus) that sustain the unique allocation
as an equilibrium, in all of them latent contracts must be oﬀered. The following example
illustrates this feature. Consider a strategy in which ﬁrms oﬀer only menus ˆ Ci. This cannot
be an equilibrium since either an incumbent or an entrant will deviate, oﬀering a proﬁtable
welfare increasing menu, in the shape of a contingent contract.
As an example, consider the following proﬁtable deviation (motivated by Abraham and
Pavoni (2005)) where in the last period the constrained eﬃcient allocation is oﬀered. Let






































Note that ˜ U(b−1) is strictly larger than the utility of autarky with b−1 additional (possi-
bly negative) resources. Firm i can deviate from the set of menus Ci deﬁned above by








T−1 − ε), ˜ y(b
i
T−1 − ε)}| solves (24) and ε>0
￿
. (25)
For ε suﬃciently small, the agent prefers this contract to the original, and, in addition, this
deviation provides additional ε
q1−T proﬁts.
In the presence of the latent contracts described in (16) and (17), the deviation (25) is
unproﬁtable. This is because at time T it implies positive net transfers from more productive
to less productive agents. So, if a high productivity agent also has access to the static labor
contract CS, he would choose in (25) the allocation designed for the low productivity agent
(collecting the positive transfers) and work the additional hours with the ﬁrm oﬀering the
latent contract CS. This strictly improves the utility of the high productivity agent since he
works the same amount of hours and receive higher consumption. This choice of the high
productivity agent makes the proﬁts of the deviation (25) negative since all agents choose
the allocation with positive transfers.
245 Conclusion
A large fraction of the literature on optimal social insurance under private information
features stark assumptions on the ability of agents to sign additional contracts. Agents
are required to be either in exclusive relationships with the insurance provider or at the
very least to sign contracts featuring an extreme level of cross-indexing. This cross-indexing
(or interdependence of contracts) takes into account any other relationship the agent might
engage, whether a labor, credit, or an insurance relationship. In many instances, the above
assumptions are driven by analytic tractability rather than empirical motivation. Real-world
contractual relationships rarely feature exclusivity clauses. Even more rare are instances
of complete cross-indexing of contracts: for example, compensation being aﬀected by the
balance in a savings account is a rare occurrence.
This paper relaxes the exclusivity assumption taking the opposite, extreme view. In
our environment, it is costless to engage in additional contractual relationships and they
are available in every period. The implications of this alternative view are signiﬁcant. Our
main result is that competition reduces the amount of insurance provided: the equilibrium
is equivalent to a self-insurance economy. In this environment, the competition between
insurance providers results in linear contracts being the only contracts oﬀered in equilibrium.
This is true in labor relationships, so that the wage always reﬂects the marginal product.
And it is true for inter-temporal contracts, so that the rate of return on debt (or savings)
is equal to the inter-temporal technical rate of transformation. Finally, in equilibrium there
is no redistribution. We also show that an equilibrium exists in this environment and that
latent contracts play an essential role.
The results of this paper have important implications for the analysis of positive ques-
tions. It provides a micro-foundation of standard incomplete market models based entirely
on equilibrium competition. The absence of exclusive relationships results in stark diﬀer-
ences in the allocation that arises versus an environment with complete exclusivity. These
diﬀerences can be tested by looking at data on consumption, income, and hours.20 The
20Currently being pursued in Ales and Maziero (2010).
25question is, then, which households are more likely to feature an allocation in line with an
environment with non-exclusive competition?
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28Appendix
A General Communication and Delegation Principle
In this appendix we deﬁne a general communication mechanism and show that the equilib-
rium of a communication game can be implemented as an equilibrium of a menu game in
which ﬁrms oﬀer a menu of payoﬀ relevant alternatives, with the agents choosing from it.
This result is necessary since, under non-exclusive contracting, the preference ordering
of the agents is inﬂuenced not only by their exogenous private information, but also by the
set of contracts oﬀered. This implies that restricting to a direct mechanism may not allow a
ﬁrm to have a rich enough communication with the agent in order to obtain information on
the other contracts.21
Communication
Firms and agents communicate according to a communication mechanism, which consists,
for each ﬁrm i ∈{ 1,...,I}, of a time 0 report space Ri and message spaces Mi
t for each
t ∈{ 1,...,T}. The set of all possible messages that an agent can send to ﬁrm i up to
time t is denoted by Mi,t = Mi
1 × ... ×M i
t. For a given message space, each ﬁrm chooses
allocation functions gi
t : Mi,t → R × R+, which specify net-transfers of consumption and




t(Mi,t) is the set of all measurable mappings from
message space Mi,t to the allocation space R×R+. The contract φi determines, conditional
on the report ri, the allocation functions an agent will have access to in all future periods.
To shorten notation, let Gi(Mi,T) ≡ Gi
1(Mi,1) × ... × Gi
T(Mi,T). Let Φi(Ri,Mi,T) be the
set of all measurable mappings from reporting space Ri to the set Gi(Mi,T), and note that
φi ∈ Φi(Ri,Mi,T). We summarize all the message spaces as follows, let M = ×I
i=1Mi,T and
R = ×I
i=1Ri. Denote the game associated with the communication mechanism (M,R)b y
ΓM,R.
At time 0, before any uncertainty is realized, each ﬁrm i simultaneously oﬀers a collection
of allocation functions φi, and agents communicate with ﬁrms sending a message ri. This
message determines, through φi, the functions gi
t at every subsequent period t. The timing
of the game ΓM,R is the following:
• At time 0:
1. Each ﬁrm i simultaneously oﬀers contract φi : Ri → Gi(Mi,T);
2. Agents send a report ri ∈R i to each ﬁrm i.
• At time t:
21Epstein and Peters (1999) showed that in games with multiple principals, there exists a universal type
space for which the revelation principle holds. This space must be rich enough to allow agents and ﬁrms to
communicate the exogenous type space and the information about the contracts oﬀered by other principals.
However, this universal type space is hard to characterize in applications; hence we do not follow their
approach.
291. Agent learns his private type θt;
2. Firm oﬀers allocation rule gi
t : Mi,t → R × R+ according to φi(ri);
3. Agent sends a message mi
t ∈M i
t to each ﬁrm i;
4. Payoﬀs are realized: output is produced and net-transfers are made.
Given messages (M,R), we consider a static Nash equilibrium played by ﬁrms at time 0
when choosing the contracts that are oﬀered in future periods. Given these contracts, agents
optimize choosing the report at time 0 and messages in every period t =1 ,...,T.
Deﬁnition 2 (Equilibrium of Communication Game). A pure strategy equilibrium of
ΓM,R is (r∗,m ∗,φ ∗,g∗) such that:
1. Agent’s message m∗
t: G1
t × ... × GI




































i=1 (bi(mi,t)+y(mi,t)) ≥ 0,
￿I
i=1 y(mi,t) ≥ 0, ∀t
where (b(mi,t),y(mi,t)) = g
∗,i
t (mi,t) and UT+1(·) ≡ 0.






where gi = φi,∗(ri).
3. Taking as given the choices of the other ﬁrms and the agents’ choices, for each ﬁrm

















t(θt)=b(mt,∗(θt)), gi = φi (ri,∗) and g−i,∗ = φ−i,∗ (r−i,∗).
Denote the equilibrium allocation of a general communication game by (b∗,y∗).
Menu Games
A communication mechanism induces allocation functions and, hence, distribution over
allocations. This means that to prove the equivalence between the equilibrium allocation of
a given communication mechanism and the equilibrium of a menu game, it is essential that
the menus oﬀered are rich enough to capture the strategies used to implement equilibrium
30in a communication mechanism. In our environment, a menu is a sequence of sets, with each
set being a subset of the allocation space R × R+. For a message space (M,R), deﬁne, for
each ﬁrm i, the set Ci
t(mi,t−1,Mi
t|Gi
t) as the menu that can be implemented by a message
space Mi
t at time t given a history of messages mi,t−1 and a set of allocation functions Gi
t.







































Each set deﬁned in (26) contains all subsets of R × R+ with cardinality at most Mi
t.
For any subset Gi
t ⊆ Gi
t(Mi,t), let Gi ≡ Gi
1 × ... × Gi
t and deﬁne a sequence of menus























At time 0, each agent chooses a sequence of menus in the collection oﬀered by ﬁrm

















This set contains all the collections of sets Ci with cardinality less than or equal to the
cardinality of Ri. Without explicitly writing the dependence on the message spaces, let
Si = Ci(Ri,Mi) be the menus oﬀered by ﬁrm i and let Ci be an element of Si. Let ΓC,S be
the game associated with menus (C,S).
The following proposition shows that an equilibrium in a general communication system
can be implemented as an equilibrium of a menu game. In this menu game, the collection of
menus oﬀered by each ﬁrm must be compatible with the general communication mechanism
as deﬁned above.
Proposition 4 (Delegation Principle). Let (b∗,y∗) be an equilibrium allocation of a general
communication game ΓM,R. Then there exists (ˆ b, ˆ y) that is an equilibrium allocation of a
menu game ΓC,S and (b∗,y∗)=( ˆ b, ˆ y).
Proof. The proof is by construction. Starting from the equilibrium strategies of a general
communication game, we construct strategies for a menu game and show that these strategies
constitute an equilibrium.
Deﬁne as in (26) and (29) respectively the menus and the collection of menus that are










The collection of menus ˆ Si contains all the subsets of the allocation space that are consistent
31with the collection of allocation functions in the original equilibrium. Agents’ strategies are
deﬁned as follows.
ˆ C
i = { ˆ C
i
t ∈ ˆ S



















Note that by construction ˆ Ci
t ∈ ˆ Si and (ˆ bi(θt), ˆ yi(θt)) ∈ ˆ Ci
t, ∀θt, ∀t. The menu ˆ Ci
t is the
subset of allocation space, R2, that corresponds to the allocation function chosen by the
agent in the original equilibrium. Also (ˆ bi, ˆ yi) corresponds to allocation determined by the
allocation function given the equilibrium message sent by each type θt. If agents and ﬁrms
follow these strategies, the equilibrium allocation in the menu game is the same as in the
original equilibrium.
First, let’s show that the agents’ strategies are an equilibrium. Suppose that at some
time t, for some ﬁrm i ∃ (bi
t,yi
























t−1,b t, ˆ y































t) ∈ ˆ Ci
t, there exists mi
t ∈M i
























































But this contradicts mi,∗ being an equilibrium in the original game. Now suppose ˆ Ci is not
an equilibrium for some i. There exists some Ci ∈ ˆ Si such that:
U(C
i, ˆ C−i) >U( ˆ C).

















But this contradicts ri,∗ being an equilibrium in the original game.
Finally, we check that ﬁrms’ strategies constitute an equilibrium. Suppose ∃S i ∈
Si(Ri,Mi) such that V i(Si, ˆ S−i) >Vi( ˆ Si, ˆ S−i).
32Since Si ∈S i(Ri,Mi), there exists φi such that gi = φi(ri,∗). Replacing in the ﬁrm’s
payoﬀ in the original game V i(φi,φ ∗
−i) >V i(φi,∗,φ ∗
−i). But this contradicts φi,∗ being an
equilibrium in the original game.
Proposition 4 states that for given message spaces (M,R), there exists a menu game that
implements the same equilibrium allocation. It is important to note that message spaces
restrict the menus that can be oﬀered in a menu game. Hence, if ﬁrms are allowed to use
unrestricted message spaces, the same equilibrium allocation can be implemented if ﬁrms
can oﬀer unrestricted menus. The same result is shown in Martimort and Stole (2002)f o ra
similar environment (see footnote 11 for details).
B Proofs of Section 3
B.1 Proof of Lemma 2












In this case, the agent is borrowing constrained. An entrant can make strictly positive proﬁts
oﬀering a borrowing contract at a rate higher than 1/q, contradicting the original allocation
being an equilibrium. The ﬁrst step is to construct the contract to be oﬀered by a ﬁrm. Let


































If ε = 0, the solution for the above problem is δ∗(0) > 0 given that (31) holds. From
the Theorem of the Maximum, the solution δ∗(ε) is continuous on ε. Fix ￿1 > 0 such that
|δ∗(0)−0| >￿ 1. There exists ￿2 > 0 such that if |ε−0| <￿ 2 then |δ∗(ε)−δ∗(0)| <￿ 1.L e tε be
such that 0 <ε<￿ 2.22 Consider an entrant that oﬀers the contract Ct = {(δ∗(ε),0),(0,0)}
and Ct+1 = {(−δ∗(ε)(1
q + ε),0),(0,0)}) and the contract (0,0) for all other periods. This
ﬁrm is making strictly positive proﬁts, proportional to δ∗(ε)ε, and the agent is strictly better
oﬀ keeping the original equilibrium together with this contract since it increases his utility
in a history with positive probability and keeps the same utility in all other histories.
22Note that u￿(ct(ˆ θt)+δ∗(ε)) is a ﬁnite, strictly positive number and hence is also the right hand side of





> 0 for all (ˆ θt,θ t+1).
33Hence, under the original equilibrium, a ﬁrm can oﬀer a contract that makes strictly
positive proﬁts. This contradicts the allocation being an equilibrium.
The other case can be proved using a similar argument.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 1

















t−1 =( θt,θ t+1,...,θ n) is the sequence of shocks following history θt−1 from time t to
n and bn(θt−1,θ n
t−1) is the equilibrium transfer chosen at time n by an agent with history θn.
We show, using a backward induction argument, that for all t, As(θs−1,θ T
s−1) is independent
of θT
s−1 for all s ≥ t. This implies that A1(θT) is the same for all θT ∈ ΘT.I fA1(θT) > 0, ﬁrms
make strictly negative proﬁts in equilibrium, and would be better oﬀ oﬀering a null contract.
If A1(θT) < 0, an entrant can oﬀer the same sequence of transfers, giving an additional
transfer ε>0 in the terminal period. Since the sequence of transfers is not contingent and
is proﬁtable for all types, there is no latent contract that makes it unproﬁtable.
1. Equations (10) and (11) hold for t = T.
We ﬁrst show that at time T, transfers are independent of realization of time T shock, and
then show that for time T equation (11) holds.
Equation (10) holds at t = T:
Suppose that (10) does not hold and let b(θT) = minb∈C(bT−1,yT−1) b and b(θT−1, ˆ θT) the second
smallest b. Denote by ˆ θT =( θT−1, ˆ θT). The contradiction argument relies on the incumbent
ﬁrm deviating to an allocation that delivers higher proﬁts. First note that it must be true
that y(ˆ θT)+b(ˆ θT) >y (θT)+b(θT). If not, given that b(ˆ θT) >b (θT) then y(ˆ θT) <y (θT), an
entrant ﬁrm can oﬀer the following contract ˜ CT = {(−ε,y(θT) − y(ˆ θT));(0,0)}, for some ε
small enough. An agent with type θT is better oﬀ by choosing allocation (b(ˆ θT),y(ˆ θT)) in























where the inequality holds as long as b(ˆ θT)−ε>b (θT). No latent contracts can prevent this
deviation, since it is proﬁtable for the entrant as long as some agent accepts it.23
23Note that this case arises in the solution of the constrained eﬃcient allocation: high skilled agents work
more and make positive transfers to less skilled agents. The deviation ˜ CT makes this allocation unproﬁtable
in our environment, since it induces skilled agents to choose the allocation designed for low skilled agents
and to work an additional amount with an entrant.































Case 1 If (35) holds with equality, an agent of type ˆ θT is indiﬀerent between his equilibrium
choice and the choice of agent θT. However, the insurance providers receive strictly higher
proﬁts from the allocation θT, since by assumption b(ˆ θT) >b (θT). This incumbent can
deviate to an alternative menu that diﬀers from the original by oﬀering at time T only the
allocation chosen by agent θT. No latent contract can induce lower proﬁts to deter this
deviation, since now the deviating incumbent oﬀers a subset of the allocations that were
available in the original equilibrium. The argument also holds if the equilibrium allocation
is divided between multiple insurance providers.
Case 2 Suppose that (35) holds with strict inequality. Following the argument in the
previous case, for any type ¯ θT such that b
￿¯ θT
￿
















Otherwise, the incumbent ﬁrm will oﬀer only the contract containing bT(θT).
Consider the following deviation by an incumbent ﬁrm ˜ b(ˆ θT)=b(ˆ θT) − ε and ˜ b(θT)=
b(θT)+ε − δ for ε,δ > 0a n dε>δ(to be deﬁned explicitly below) and keeping unchanged
all the other allocations.24 This deviation reduces the spread of transfers and increases the
incumbent’s proﬁt by a factor proportional to δ.
To show that such deviation is proﬁtable, thus reaching a contradiction, we show that
there is no latent contract α ≡ (αb,α y) that can induce a reduction in the proﬁts of this
ﬁrm. Suppose such a contract exists. One possibility is to induce θT agents, when faced with
the deviating allocation ˜ b, to choose ˜ b(ˆ θT). This would imply a reduction of proﬁts, since
˜ b(ˆ θT) > ˜ b(θT). Such latent contract has to satisfy:
u(˜ b(ˆ θ
T)+y(ˆ θ





























24If there are multiple θ with values equal to b(ˆ θT) or b(θT), the same deviation applies to all such transfers.
35However, u(˜ b(θT)+y(θT)) >u (b(θT)+y(θT)) and u(b(ˆ θT)+y(ˆ θT)+αb + αy) >u (˜ b(ˆ θT)+








>u (˜ b(ˆ θ
T)+y(ˆ θ









































The previous equation must hold with equality, otherwise in the original equilibrium the
























This gives the minimum utility gain agent ¯ θT receives from choosing allocation (b(¯ θT),y(¯ θT))






























T)+¯ αb +¯ αy + ε
￿¯ θ
￿






Let ε = min¯ θ￿=θ ε
￿¯ θ
￿
. Under this choice of ε, the above equation contradicts (42). Equation
(44) also implies that for all ¯ θ ￿= θ, the choice following the deviation is the same as in the
original equilibrium.
The last step in the proof requires checking that the time T − 1 incentive constraints
hold. This is necessary in order to leave the decision of the agents unchanged at time T −1.
Note that for a given ε>0, there exists δ∗ > 0 that makes the utility, calculated in time
36T − 1, of the modiﬁed contract the same as in the original contract. To see this, note that
if δ = ε the change in utility of the agent is negative following the proposed deviation, while
if δ = 0 the utility change is positive, since the agent now faces a reduction in the spread
of consumption at time T because y(ˆ θT)+b(ˆ θT) >y (θT)+b(θT). This implies that there
exists an intermediate value of δ∗ such that ε>δ ∗ > 0 so that the change is zero. Hence,
the time T − 1 decision will be unchanged if δ = δ∗.
Equation (11) holds at time t = T:
















In this case, the agent would like to consume and work less than the equilibrium contract. A
deviation that reduces the total output and consumption by agent θT cannot be provided by
an entrant, since a worker cannot deliver negative hours. However, an incumbent ﬁrm will
ﬁnd it optimal to deviate from the equilibrium contract, oﬀering an allocation with lower
consumption and lower output requirement and making strictly positive proﬁts. Formally,
it oﬀers the original contract at all time t<Tand at time T, a menu that contains a null




























where δ∗ and ε are constructed in a similar fashion to the proof of Lemma 1, with the
constraint δ ≤ 0.
With this deviation, the incumbent makes strictly positive proﬁts, proportional to ε, and
there exists ε so that agents’ utility is unchanged following this deviation. This guarantees
that no deviation at time T − 1 takes place. This contract is always proﬁtable for the
incumbent even if another type ˜ θT accepts it. If an agent with type ˜ θT is able to choose the
pair (b(θT)+y(θT)+δ∗(ε|θT) − ε,y(θT)+δ∗(ε|θT)) at time T, it implies that he must also
have chosen the allocation sequence {(b(θn)+y(θn),y(θn))}
T−1
n=1 in previous periods. From
the previous step in the proposition, transfers from any history are independent of time T;
i.e., this agent will receive transfers with the same net present value as in the original choice.
Hence, the deviation is proﬁtable.
2. Equations (10) and (11) hold for t<T.
37As an inductive assumption, suppose (10) holds for t + 1. We now show it holds for period































By way of contradiction, there exist θt and ˆ θt following history θt−1 such that
bt(θ
t−1,θ t)+qAt+1(θ
t−1,θ t) <b t(θ
t−1, ˆ θt)+qAt+1(θ
t−1, ˆ θt). (46)
By the inductive assumption bt(θt−1,θ t) <b t(θt−1, ˆ θt). As in the proof for time T, the
contradiction argument relies on deviations by entrants to guarantee that (11) holds and on
deviations by entrant and incumbent ﬁrms to imply that the net present value of transfers
is zero.
Under the inductive assumption, the agent faces no distortion on both his intratemporal
margin and inter-temporal margin (recall Lemma 2) from time t + 1 onward. This implies
that the equilibrium allocation from time t + 1 onwards is equivalent to a self-insurance
economy (this will be formally proved in Proposition 2). Let St+1(x) be the utility the
agent receives from entering time t + 1 with a level x of net present value of assets. The
value function S is monotonically increasing in the level of assets. Given this, the agents’


























































38If y(θt) ≥ y(ˆ θt), an entrant can oﬀer the following menu that enables the agent to work




t) − b(ˆ θ
t),y(θ
















This menu generates strictly positive proﬁts to the entrant, proportional to ε. If this menu
is oﬀered, agent θt will deviate, accepting the allocation for ˆ θt together with the allocation
speciﬁed in the entrant’s menu. This is due to the fact that the agent can now replicate
his original time t level of output and have access to a strictly higher net present value of
transfers at a cost equal to ε.
Suppose now that y(θt) <y (ˆ θt). The ﬁrst case we consider is when consumption at time t is
higher for the agent with a higher net present value of transfer, y(θt)+b(θt) <y (ˆ θt)+b(ˆ θt).
As in the argument for period T, inequality (47) cannot hold with equality. This enables us
to reduce the time t spread of consumption between histories θt and ˆ θt. Following the same
steps of time T, a contradiction can be reached.
The ﬁnal case is y(θt) <y (ˆ θt) and y(θt)+b(θt) ≥ y(ˆ θt)+b(ˆ θt). This case violates the
inter-temporal Euler equation for at least one of the two types, thus contradicting Lemma


































where the last implication follows from the fact that an agent with higher transfer will have
higher consumption at time t + 1, thus a lower expected marginal utility of consumption.
To conclude, given that it was shown that the net present value of transfers is independent
of the time t choice, we can follow the same steps as in time T to show that equation (45)
holds for time t.
CP r o o f o f L e m m a 4
Proof.







− b + b(θ) − Eθ − b
∗






+ β ˜ W(xθ).














+β ˜ W(ˆ x(θ)+Eθ+b
∗
θ).














+βW(ˆ x(θ)+Eθ,θ) ≥ W.













+ β ˜ W(xθ)= ˆ W.
2. Consider the total derivative of G relative to the scale parameter g. Using the opti-



















Deﬁne for each θ ∈ Θ, A(θ)=b(θ) − Eθ − b∗
θ − E.














− b + xθ + yθ + E
￿













− b + xθ + yθ + E
￿
, if A(θ) < 0.
Where x∗
θ + y∗
θ denotes the optimal choice given additional resources equal to g · A(θ),
the above equations imply that G￿(g) ≤ G￿(0) for all g>0.
The above does not rule out the case of G(1) = G(0). This could arise if the entrant
oﬀers a contract such that b∗
θ = 0 for all θ together with b(θ) − Eθ = E for all θ.
25This proof applies for any ﬁnite number of periods. For T ≥ 3 the variable b is the relevant state variable






π(θ)[b(θ) − Eθ − b
∗
θ − E]u
￿(−b + xθ + yθ + E). (50)
From standard arguments, −b+xθ+yθ+E is increasing in θ so that u￿(−b+xθ+yθ+E)
is decreasing in θ.
We now show for all θ>˜ θ, b(θ)−Eθ−b∗
θ ≥ b(˜ θ)−E˜ θ−b∗
˜ θ. Suppose not: b(θ)−Eθ−b∗
θ <
b(˜ θ)−E˜ θ−b∗
˜ θ. Since the allocation (b(θ),y(θ)) was chosen in equilibrium, it must satisfy:





+ βW(ˆ x(θ)+Eθ,θ) ≥
u
￿








+βW(ˆ x(˜ θ)+E˜ θ + δx, ˜ θ)
for any feasible δx and δy. In particular, let δy = y(θ)+ˆ y(θ) − y(˜ θ) − ˆ y(˜ θ) and
δx = b(θ)+ˆ x(θ) − b(˜ θ) − ˆ x(˜ θ). Lemma 3 implies that δy ≥ 0, and hence is feasible.
Using this deﬁnition, the above becomes:





+ βW(ˆ x(θ)+Eθ,θ) ≥





+ βW(E˜ θ + b(θ)+ˆ x(θ) − b(˜ θ), ˜ θ) ⇒
W(ˆ x(θ)+Eθ,θ) ≥ W(E˜ θ + b(θ)+ˆ x(θ) − b(˜ θ), ˜ θ).
Note that
˜ W(ˆ x(θ)+Eθ + b
∗
θ) ≥ ˜ W(E˜ θ + b(θ)+ˆ x(θ) − b(˜ θ)+b
∗
˜ θ).
Since ˜ W is strictly decreasing, then
ˆ x(θ)+Eθ + b
∗
θ ≤ E˜ θ + b(θ)+ˆ x(θ) − b(˜ θ)+b
∗
˜ θ,
which is a contradiction. Finally since b(θ) − Eθ − b∗
θ − E is increasing in θ and also
￿
θ
π(θ)[b(θ) − Eθ − b
∗
θ − E] < 0,
(since b∗
θ ≥ 0 for all θ) we ﬁnd that G￿(0) < 0.26
26An heuristic argument to show this is to rewrite (50) as
￿
θ π(θ)A(θ)B(θ)=Eθ[A(θ)]Eθ[B(θ)] +
cov[A(θ)][B(θ)].
41